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Raynal: With Great Technology Comes Great Responsibility: Why Smartphone

NOTE
WITH GREAT TECHNOLOGY COMES GREAT
RESPONSIBILITY:
WHY SMARTPHONE USERS'BIOMETRIC DATA
NEEDSTOBEPROTECTED
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine an individual going about a daily routine, only to find out
later that the person's face has been stolen without their consent.' This
nightmare became all too real for Lindabeth Rivera of Illinois in the
months leading up to March 2016.2 Lindabeth was one of many victims
of biometric identity theft, as approximately eleven photographs were
taken of her by a "Google Droid" device and automatically uploaded to
Google's cloud-based storage service, Google Photos. 3 It didn't stop
there: Google then created a unique face template by scanning
Lindabeth's facial and geometric features without first obtaining her
consent.' In Rivera v. Google, Inc., Lindabeth sued Google for violating
Illinois's Biometric Information Privacy Act ("BIPA"), which forbids the
unauthorized collection and storing of a subject's biometric data.'
Joseph Weiss joined Lindabeth in her suit against Google on the
same grounds. 6 Google took photographs directly from Joseph's own
smartphone device and used those photographs to unlawfully create a face
scan of Joseph's facial features.' In both situations, the photos were
immediately uploaded to Google Photos and scanned to create custom
face-templates that map and record distinct facial measurements
and contours.'
1. Rivera v. Google, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1090-91 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (noting that an
Illinois resident who had purchased the Droid device in Illinois "captured 'approximately eleven'
photographs"ofplaintiffRivera).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/15(b) (2008); see Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1090, 1093.
6. Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1090-91.
7. Id. at 1091.
8. Id.
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Google did not simply use the photographs to map the subjects'
facial features, but further used the illegal face-templates to recognize
Lindabeth's and Joseph's age, location, gender, and race, among other
things.' In both cases, at the time of uploading and scanning, the devices
were in the state of Illinois and carried Illinois IP addresses.1 0 The only
difference between the two stories is that Joseph was a user of his own
Google Droid smartphone and Google Photos, whereas Lindabeth had
neither a Droid nor a Google Photos account."
In Rivera v. Google, Inc., suit was brought in federal district court in
Illinois by Lindabeth and Joseph, individually and on behalf of a class of
people similarly situated. 1 2 The plaintiffs argued that the face geometry
templates created by Google are "biometric identifiers" and thus are
protected under the BIiPA. 1 3 Their stories are just two examples of the
privacy horrors facing today's society as the use of biometrics grows
across industries. 1 4 These horrors constitute threats to citizens' privacy
and civil liberties as biometrics like facial recognition can easily be used
to identify large amounts of people and can be used for indiscriminate
surveillance of the general public.
The advancement of smartphone technology and the constant need
to remain relevant has led to the prevalence of biometric and facial
recognition technology in smartphones. 6 What was once known as a
"landline" telephone is slowly fading out of memory. 17 Nowadays,
smartphone devices continue to advance at breakneck speeds, further
impacting the entire globe with seemingly no end in sight." Apple has
indicated that facial recognition is not intended for children under thirteen
years of age, due to the fact that their faces have not fully developed
distinct facial features; as such, their use of facial recognition can lead to
increased security risks.1 9 It is unclear, however, whether Apple
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

14.

Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry's Collection of

Biometric Information, 66 KAN. L. REv. 637, 639-43 (2018).
15.

Jeramie D. Scott, FacialRecognitionSurveillance Is Here, but PrivacyProtectionsAre Not,

THE HIL (July 13, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/341906opinion-facial-recognition-surveillance-is-here-but-privacy.
16. See infra Parts H-IV.

17. Steven I. Friedland, Riley v. California and the Stickiness Principle, 14 DUKE L. &TECH.
REv. 121, 125-26 (2016).
18. Id
19. James Titcomb, iPhoneX's FacialRecognition Is Notfor Children Under 13, Says Apple,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 17, 2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/09/27/iphonexs-facial-recognition-not-children-13-says-apple.
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recognizes any security concerns about collecting and storing children's
biometric identifiers.2 0
Notably, the storage capacity of smartphones is what makes them so
popular, and yet, so dangerous.2 1 Smartphone devices can "store and
disseminate huge amounts of data, photos, financial records, emails,
instant messages, notes and other information." 22 However, this data is
secured by passcodes or biometric sensors, leaving many smartphone
users viewing fingerprint identification as a secure means to protect
biometric and other sensitive information stored on mobile devices.23
Regardless of how impressive it is to have such great technological
power in peoples' hands, such "[t]echnological advances have turned our
privacy jurisprudence on end." 2 4 Chief Justice John Roberts has opined
that "some of the [C]ourt's most challenging cases involve applying longheld rules created by the courts to quickly developing technology." 25 This
new technology has given rise to the biometric system, a security system
that recognizes the user registered to that particular smartphone.2 6 Once
this information is in a database, "biometric authentication can then be
used to either verify an individual's identity, or to identify an unknown
person." 2 7What was once a concept of fiction, employed by the likes of
James Bond and other high-tech spies on the big screen, has now become
a reality.28
While biometric technology is a recent phenomenon in smartphones,
the use of biometric identification is nothing new to the federal
government. 2 9In the final year of his presidency, President George W.
Bush issued the Directive on Biometrics for Identification and Screening
To Enhance National Security which established
a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and
agencies ... use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Friedland, supra note 17, at 126, 130-31.
Id at 126.

23.
24.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 637.
Anne T. McKenna, Pass ParallelPrivacy Standardsor Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L.

REV. 1041,1043 (2013).
25.

Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Takes on Major Fourth Amendment Case, CNN (Nov.

29, 2017, 3:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/supreme-court-fourth-amendmentcase/index.html; see, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. CL 2473, 2489-91 (2014).
26.
27.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 640.
Id. at 641; see Erin M. Sales, Note, The "Biometric Revolution": An Erosion ofthe Fifth

Amendment Privilege to be Freefrom Self-Incrimination, 69 U. MIAMI L. REv. 193, 213-14 (2014).
28.

Phil Ross, Biometrics:A Developing Regulatory Landscapefor a New Era ofTechnology,

PRIVACY REP. (May 21, 2014), https://theprivacyreport.com/2014/05/21/biometrics-a-developingregulatory-landscape-for-a-new-era-of-technology.
29. Sales, supra note 27, at 214.
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collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and
associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a
lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information
privacy and other legal rights under United States law. 30
Furthermore, government fingerprint identification has been used in the
3
Biometric
criminal context "since the early twentieth century."
identifiers, such as fingerprint scanning, became such a source of
confidence among law enforcement agencies that its use and popularity
quickly transitioned to the private sector.3 2
The ease with which biometric scanners can be embedded into
smartphones has led to "fingerprint-based authentication becoming more
and more popular in a number of civilian and commercial applications
such as, welfare disbursement, cellular phone access, and laptop computer
log-in." 3 3 Further, the uniqueness of fingerprints adds to its popularity
among smartphone users, as "all fingertips have unique ridge formation
patterns." 3 4 Because an individual's fingerprint is so unique and doesn't
change over time, fingerprint-scanning is a quick, easy, and noninvasive
35
method of authenticating a smartphone user. However, fingerprint
authentication has its drawbacks, as fingerprints can easily be lifted from
surfaces with tape. 3 6 Despite this, the biometric systems market continues
to grow.

37

The value of the biometrics system market has been growing
exponentially. In 2017, the biometrics system market was valued at

"USD 13.89 billion ...

and is expected to reach USD 41.80 billion by

2023, at a [Compound Annual Growth Rate] of 19.99% during the
forecast period." 3 9 Among the multifactor authentication methods in
30. Id. at 214; see Directive on Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National
Security, 1 PUB. PAPERS 757 (June 5, 2008) (acknowledging that many agencies were already
collecting biometric information in their identification and screening processes, and that the
harmonization of their collecting, storing, and sharing procedures would help identify "individuals
who may do harm to Americans and the Nation").
31. Sales, supra note 27, at 215.
3 2. Id.
33. Id. (quoting A. Jameer Basha et al., Efficient MultimodalBiometricAuthenticationUsing
FastFingerprintVerification and Enhanced Iris Features,7 J. COMPUTER SCI. 698, 698 (2011)).

34. Sales, supra note 27, at 215.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Biometric System Market by Authentication Type (Single-Factor and Multifactor),
Functionality Type (Contact, Non-Contact, and Combined), Component (Hardwareand Software),
Application, and Geography - Global Forecast to 2023, MARKETSANDMARKETS (July 2018),

https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/next-generation-biometric-technologies-mar
ket-697.html.
3 8. Id.
39. Id. (explaining that the base year used for the biometrics system market study is 2017, and
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biometrics systems, "pin [codes] with biometrics held the largest share in
2017. The systems based on both biometrics and PIN are cost-effective
and use a secure method for authentication compared with other
multifactor authentication systems." 4 0
Biometric technology has been around for years; "in the 1960s,
scientists (both civilian and military) began to explore the technological
ability to 'identify, at a distance, specific individuals among the enemy
ranks."' 41 Apple, however, brought biometric technology into users'
homes when it started using biometric technology in its devices in 2013.42
Apple's announcement that the iPhone 5S "would include a fingerprint
scanner to support its then-new Touch ID security protocol" changed the
smartphone game. 4 3 Fast-forward to April 2017 when Apple's rival
manufacturer, Samsung, released its flagship Galaxy S8 in the United
States." The technology in the Galaxy S8 included facial and iris
recognition technology, along with a fingerprint scanner, "something
noticeably absent from the iPhone X," which was released in the United
States in November 2017.45
In late September 2018, Apple released a trio ofiPhones, namely the
iPhone XS, iPhone XS Max, and iPhone XR, all of which boast Apple's
latest A12 Bionic processor.46 Aside from 50% increased speed and a
tremendous increase in storage capacity, the A12 Bionic processor's
neural engine is used for "running machine learning and artificial
intelligence software used in everything from recognizing faces to
understanding voice commands."4 7
Most recently, according to a Techspot article, a full-screen
fingerprint scanner patent submitted by Samsung was published in
the forecast period is 2018-2023).
40. Id.
41.

Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do: FacialRecognition

Technology and the Growing Lack ofPrivacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 94 (2017) (quoting
KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE
OF SURVEILLANCE 29 (2011)).
42. Rahul Chadha, Like It or Not, Smartphones with Biometrics Will Soon Be the Norm,
EMARKETER (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Like-Not-Smartphones-with-

Biometrics-Will-Soon-Norm/1016472.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45.

Id.; see also KifLeswing, Here's How Much the High-EndiPhoneX Costs and When You

Can BuyIt, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 12,2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-iphonex-release-date-price-features-2017-9?IR=T.
46. Carly Page, iPhoneXS Release Date, Priceand Specs: iPhone AS Packs a Smaller Battery
Than the iPhoneX, INQUIRER (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3021021/

iphone-xs-release-date-price-and-specs-iphone-xs-smaller-battery-than-iphone-x.
47. Stephen Shankland, iPhoneXSA12 Bionic Chip Is Industry-First7nm CPU, CNET (Sept.
12, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/iphone-xs-al2-bionic-chip-is-industry-first-7nmCpu.
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October 2018.48 The patent proposed an upgrade to already-existing
smartphone biometric sensors, by describing "using a biometric scanner
built into the display layer itself." 49 Currently, smartphones equipped with
biometric sensors require users to touch a particular portion of the screen
where the biometric sensor is located.o Samsung's new patent will allow
a user to unlock their phone by placing their finger anywhere on the
display screen." The full-screen scanner is intended to quicken the
biometric authentication process by employing a separate, low-energy
processor that, upon sensing a finger on the screen, brightens the display
and quickly scans the fingerprint three times.52
Much, if not all, of our lives are digitally stored on our smartphones
and "it's important to protect that information."5 3 Just as fingerprint
identification ("fingerprint "ID") revolutionized the way consumers used
their smartphones, face identification ("face ID") enabled by Apple's
state-of-the-art TrueDepth camera system now allows consumers to
unlock their phones with a simple glance.54 It doesn't stop there: Face ID
can be used to "authorize purchases from the iTunes Store, App Store, and
Apple Books, and payments with Apple Pay."" Moreover, applications
56
("apps") that allow fingerprint ID now also support face ID.
With biometric technology advancements unveiled with the release
of each new smartphone, such as the storage abilities of Apple's new A12
Bionic processor, users are increasingly able to store different types of
biometric identifying information on their phones. However, "despite
the popularity of biometrics and the unique issues they pose, there is no
generally applicable federal law that regulates the private sector's
collection and use of biometric information in the United States."
Biometric data protection is an issue that covers the entire globe, and
some countries, including those that make up the European Union ("EU'),
48.

Rob Thubron, Samsung PatentShow OffFull-ScreenFingerprintScanner, Phone With Tiny

Notch, TECHSPOT (Oct. 22,2018,5:24 AM), https://www.techspot.com/news/77027-samsung-patentshows-vision-full-screen-fingerprint-scanner.html.
49. Id.
5 0. Id.
51. Samsung's Patent Aims to Make the Whole Screen an In-Display FingerprintScanner,
https://www.firstpost.com/tech/newsPM),
4:41
2018,
23,
TECH2 (Oct.
FIRSTPOST:
4299 3

1.ht
analysis/samsungs-patent-promises-in-display-fingerprint-scanner-on-the-whole-screen-5
ml.
52. Thubron, supranote 48.
53. About FaceID Advanced Technology, APPLE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://support.apple.com/enus/HT208108 [hereinafter Apple].
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id
57.
58.

Shankland, supranote 47.
Zimmerman, supranote 14, at 638.
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have already taken steps to expand the definition ofprivacy.5 9 InMay
2018, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") became
effective. 6 0Through the GDPR, the EU considers biometric data "a
special category of personal data that calls for stricter rules on the
processing of that data." 6 As such, the GDPR aims to provide uniformity
across the EU as well as further "safeguard individual citizens' data rights
in the increasingly technological world." 6 2
Biometric data is unique to the individual and it therefore needs to
be regulated. 6 3This is especially true because the government is not the
only entity that collects personal data: Thanks to the biometric
identification systems preloaded onto their smartphones, private
companies, such as Apple, Samsung, and Google, among others, also
collect and store vast amounts of personal data, including biometric data.'
This Note focuses on biometric data because of its increased relevance in
today's society and because of the personal and permanent nature of the
data. 6 5This Note explores the most progressive privacy legislation in the
EU, the GDPR, current state biometric laws, such as Illinois' BIPA, and
argues for a preventative approach to biometric data privacy.6 6
In Part H, this Note gives background information pertaining to the
Fourth Amendment right to privacy, how the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy applies to today's technological society, and the EU's response to
biometric privacy issues. 67 Part III explores the lack of biometric privacy
law in the United States and how the lack of federal regulation of
biometric data fails to protect the public from threats to privacy and civil
liberties and leaves the future of privacy uncertain for consumers." Part
III further addresses and compares current leading state biometric privacy
laws. 6 9Part V offers a solution to the aforementioned issue by proposing
broad federal legislation and the creation of the Federal Biometric Data

59. Michael Monajemi, Privacy Regulation in the Age ofBiometrics That Deal with a New
World Order ofInformation, 25 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 371, 374 (2018).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 374-75.
63. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 641 (discussing unique characteristics of biometric
identifying data and how biometric data is widely unregulated).
64. Id. at 641, 643.
65. See id. at 638 (discussing the concerns of unique biometric identifying data and discussing
how biometric data is generally unregulated).
66. See infra Parts II-IV.
67.

See infra Part II.

68. See infra PartIII.
69. See infra PartIII.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

186

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:179

Agency, which would be responsible for regulating the collection, storage,
and use of smartphone users' sensitive data.7 0
II.

BIOMETRIC DATA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
71
citizens of the United States from unreasonable searches and seizures.
More specifically, the Fourth Amendment grants the "right ofthe people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 72 The majority of Fourth
Amendment privacy arguments are made in an effort to curtail the
government's power and authority, as the Fourth Amendment was drafted
with specific language:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.

During the framing era itself, the drafters' primary concern was against
"general warrants." 7 4 In that time, it was thought that the Fourth
Amendment "forbade warrants that were unparticularized as to the place
or things to be searched for or that lacked specific factual grounds
justifying the search."7 5
Subpart A gives an overview of the right to privacy by discussing the
Fourth Amendment as well as notable criminal and civil cases in which
the judiciary was tasked with addressing the right to privacy in today's
digitized society. 7 6 Subpart B focuses on defining biometric data and
exploring the relationship between biometrics, smartphones, and
smartphone users. 7 Subpart C analyzes how the EU has responded to
privacy concerns resulting from biometric technology advances through
the recent enactment of the GDPR.

70. See infra Part IV.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. Id; see also Paul Ohm, The Future ofDigital Evidence Searches andSeizures: The Fourth
Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J. 1309,1310 (2012).
73. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
74. Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle The Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-Law
CriminalArrest and Search Rules In "DueProcessOfLaw"-"FourthAmendment Reasonableness"
Is Only a Modern, Destructive, JudicialMyth, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 51, 55 (2010).
75. Id.
76. See infra Part I.A.
77. See infra Part II.B.
78. See infra Part I.C.
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How the Fourth Amendment's Implied Right to Privacy
Applies to Today's Society

Separately from security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the government, the Fourth Amendment right to privacy extends to
private industry and is equally as central in today's society. In fact, they
are "'of the very essence of constitutional liberty' the guaranty of which
'is as important and as imperative as are the guarantees of the other
fundamental rights of the individual citizen."' 8 0 Many scholars have
studied the Fourth Amendment's privacy language with respect to
criminal procedure." However, technological advancements and growing
privacy concerns require interpreting the Fourth Amendment through a
more technological lens.82
Some scholars have opined that the world is headed towards a society
where privacy is nonexistent and where the Fourth Amendment's
reasonable expectation of privacy will be no more. 8 3 To illustrate this, the
United States government has already developed and begun to implement
the Biometric Optical Surveillance System ("BOSS"). 84 Through the
BOSS, the federal government has the capability of "identifying
individuals from distances of up to 100 meters."
With 292.8 million U.S. cellphone users in 2010, it is no surprise that
society has become "phone-centric." 8 6With such a high number of
cellphone users in 2010, it is likely that the majority of people walking
around on the streets today have some sort of cellphone in their
possession, making it easier for "Big Data" to collect and store their
information, and, ultimately, to identify them. 87 This is especially relevant
since, as today's society has become increasingly digitized, cellphones are
no longer used to solely make telephone calls." In addition to the classic
telephone call, cellphones have become a "multi-functional tool" that is
essentially a "pocket super-computer." 89
While there is no current federal legislation regulating citizens'
biometric data-a topic that will be discussed more fully later in this
79. Ohm, supra note 72, at 1311.
80. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963) (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
304 (1921)).
81. Ohm, supra note 72, at 1311.
82. Id. at 1311-12.
83. Id. at 1320.
84. Friedland, supra note 17, at 125.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 125-26.
87. Id at 127.
88. Id. at 126.
89. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

188

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 48:179

Note-it does not mean that the privacy issue has not made its way
through the United States judicial system. 90 The notable 1967 Supreme
Court decision in Katz v. United States 91 created the judicial framework
for the reasonable expectation of privacy test that is used in deciding
whether an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated. 9 2This test is criticized, however, because the test "rests on the
assumption that [the] hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed
and stable [sense] of privacy expectations," which ever-changing
technology disrupts.9 3
Nowadays, the issue of cellphone functionality and privacy has been
the subject of Supreme Court decisions. 94 The Court addressed the issue
of Fourth Amendment privacy as related to warrantless cellphone
searches in Riley v. California,9 5 as consolidated with United States v.
Wurie. 9 6Of particular significance in cellphone privacy cases is the fact
that cellphones now have Internet access, live turn-by-turn Global
Positioning System ("GPS") navigation systems, calendars, and much
more. 9 7 Such highly-advanced technology is an issue that Supreme Court
Justices have to struggle with. 98
In November 2011, the Supreme Court notably heard arguments
regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy in United
States v. Jones.99 Antoine Jones, a Washington, D.C. nightclub owner,
90. See McKenna, supra note 24, at 1071-72 (discussing notable United States Supreme Court
privacy decisions).
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. Id at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that to determine one's reasonable expectation
ofprivacy, courts must first consider the subjective prong, which requires that an individual"exhibit[]
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy," and then evaluate the objective prong, which
determines whether that "expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable').
93. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1071.
94. Friedland, supra note 17, at 122-23.
95. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
96. Friedland, supra note 17, at 122-23.
97. Id at 126.
98. de Vogue, supra note 25. In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed the
application of the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") on suspects' cell phone data obtained by the
FBI. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). In 2011, four men were arrested in connection with a series of
armed robberies. Id. at 2212. Defendant Timothy Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cellsite location evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that a warrant was required in order to
obtain the records. Id. Carpenter's motion was denied by the District Court and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 2213. The Supreme Court reversed, holding: (1) an individual maintains a legitimate
expectation ofprivacy, for Fourth Amendment purposes, in the record ofhis physical movements as
captured through cell-site location information ("CSLI"); (2) seven days ofhistorical CSLI obtained
from defendant's wireless carrier, pursuant to an order issued under the SCA, was the product of a
"search"; (3) the Government's access to 127 days of historical CSLI invaded defendant's reasonable
expectation ofprivacy; and (4) the Government must generally obtain a search warrant supported by
probable cause before acquiring CSLI from a wireless carrier. Id. at 2217, 2219, 2221, 2223.
99. 565 U.S. 400, 403-04 (2012) (holding that the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a
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was suspected of narcotics trafficking and was placed under FBI and D.C.
Metropolitan Police task force surveillance." Various investigative
techniques were used, including visual surveillance and phone
wiretaps.o' The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a warrant to place a GPS tracking device on the Jeep Grand
Cherokee registered to Jones's wife, as long as the device was installed
within ten days from the warrant date, and while the vehicle was located
in D.C. 102
The GPS tracker was placed on Jones's vehicle, located in Maryland,
on the eleventh day after the warrant was issued.' 0 3 For the following
twenty-eight days, the Government tracked Jones's vehicle, amassing
over 2000 pages of data on Jones, and ultimately leading to a multiplecount indictment charging Jones and several alleged co-conspirators with
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute, inter alia,
five kilograms of cocaine.'" A jury returned a guilty verdict and the
District Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment.'0 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
conviction because the evidence obtained from the GPS device violated
the Fourth Amendment. 106
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the issue of "whether
the attachment of a [GPS] tracking device to an individual's vehicle, and
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on
public streets, constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment." 1 0 7Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court, holding that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a
target's vehicle and its use of the device to monitor the vehicle's
movements constituted a "search" under the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.0s

In his opinion, Justice Scalia employed a textualist approach in
analyzing the relevant language of the Fourth Amendment:
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to
property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to "the right of
vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets,
was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
100. Id. at 402.
101. Id
102. Id. at 402-03.
103. Id. at 403.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 404.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 402.
108. Id. at 404.
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the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures"; the
phrase "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" would have been
superfluous. Consistent with this understanding, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter
half of the 20th century.1 09
Scalia stressed that the "Government physically occupied private property
for the purpose of obtaining information ... [the Court has] no doubt that
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."1 o
The Court deviated from the historical property-based approach and
cited its earlier decision in Katz v. United States."' In Katz, the Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 1 l2 The Court's
decisions in Jones and Riley v. California show an effort to protect
individuals from the government, effectively updating the Constitution by
applying privacy rights to individuals in the realm of data privacy." 3 The
ever-changing application of the language of the Fourth Amendment as it
encompasses data privacy rights warrants repeating the words of Chief
Justice Roberts, as he recognized the difficulty in keeping up with everincreasing technological advances: "[S]ome of the [C]ourt's most
challenging cases involve applying long-held rules created by the courts
to quickly developing technology."ll 4
B.

Biometric Dataand Smartphones

Today, it is just about impossible to own a smartphone that is not
equipped with some form of biometric identifying capability."
"Biometrics" is defined as "the measurement and analysis of unique
physical or behavioral characteristics (such as fingerprint or voice
patterns) especially as a means of verifying personal identity." 16
Biometric characteristics can be divided into two categories:

109. Id at 405.
110. Id. at 404-05.
111. Id. at 405-06.
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
113. Jones, 565 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court
ruled that: "(1) the interest in protecting police officers' safety did notjustify dispensing with warrant
requirement for searches of cell phone data; and (2) the interest in preventing destruction ofevidence
did not justify dispensing with warrant requirement for searches ofcell phone data." 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2486 (2014). In this case, the Court sought to protect the individual's right to cell-phone data privacy
from unwarranted intrusion by the Government." Id.

114.

de Vogue, supra note 25.

115.
116.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 637.
Biometrics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/biometrics

(last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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physiological, which concerns an individual's body composition, and
behavioral, which concerns an individual's behavioral patterns such as
gait and voice."' The most common examples of physiological biometric
identifiers being implemented in smartphones are facial recognition,
fingerprint scanning, hand geometry scanning, iris and retinal scanning,
and even vein scanning.' 1 8
According to IHS Inc., a global source of information and analytics,
the number of smartphones with embedded fingerprint sensors "is
projected to grow from 499 million in 2015 to 1.6 billion in 2020."119
Smartphone companies such as Apple, Samsung, and Huawei have not
stopped at fingerprint sensors, as automated facial recognition, hand
and heart rhythm
gesture recognition, iris scanners, hand-vein scanners,
12 0
thing."'
big
next
'the
be
to
vying
all
"are
monitors
In essence, smartphone biometric technology requires a scanning
device to record biometric authentication factors, software to convert the
scanned information into a digital format-which then compares the
recently-scanned data with stored data-and lastly, a database to securely
store biometric data. 12 1 Biometrics does not only apply to the specific
individual's identifying information; rather, biometrics is also a process
of recognizing an individual based on a "measurable physiological or
behavioral characteristic." 2 2
Apple's more recent smartphones with Face ID, for example, employ
some of the most highly sophisticated technology ever created:
The TrueDepth camera captures accurate face data by projecting and
analyzing over 30,000 invisible dots to create a depth map of [a user's]
face and also captures an infrared image of [the person's] face. A portion
of the neural engine of the All, A12 Bionic, and A12X Bionic Chipprotected within the Secure Enclave-transforms the depth map and
infrared image into a mathematical representation and compares that
representation to the enrolled facial data. Face ID automatically adapts
117.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 640; see also FAQ - Biometrics, 360 BIOMETRICS,

http://www.360biometrics.com/faq/biometrics.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
118.

Margaret Rouse, Definition:Biometrics, SEARCHSECURITY, http://searchsecurity.techtarg

et.com/definition/biometrics (last updated Dec. 2019).
119.

Jamie Fox, FingerprintSensor Market Growth Continues Upward Trajectory, IHS Says,

IS MARKIrr (Jan. 25, 2016), https://technology.is.com/571358/fmgerprint-sensor-market-growthcontinues-upward-trajectory-ihs-says.

120.
Sensor

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 637; see also Samuel Gibbs, 2015: The Year the Fingerprint
Stopped

Being

a

Gimmick,

THE

GUARDIAN

(Dec.

27,

2015),

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/27/2015-fingerprint-sensor-smartphone-security
-biometrics-data.

121.

Rouse, supra note 118.

122. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 640; see also Salil Prabhakar et al., Biometric Recognition:
Security and Privacy Concerns,IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 33, 33.
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to changes in [] appearance, such as wearing cosmetic makeup or
growing facial hair. If there is a more significant change in []
appearance, like shaving a full beard, Face ID confirms [the] identity by
using [the user's] passcode before it updates [] face data. Face ID is
designed to work with hats, scarves, glasses, contact lenses, and many
sunglasses. Furthermore, it's designed to work indoors, outdoors, and
even in total darkness. 123
The sophistication, albeit impressive, has required companies like Apple
to take increased steps to safeguard users' biometric data.1 24 Face ID
data-including the stored mathematical representations of users' facesis "encrypted and protected with a key available only to the
Secure Enclave." 125
The so-called Secure Enclave creates an added layer of security for
private keys.1 2 6 The Secure Enclave "is a hardware-based key manager
that's isolated from the main processor."127 When a key is stored in the
Secure Enclave, the user never actually handles the key, "making it
difficult for the key to become compromised."1 28 While the Secure
Enclave's security measures are a significant step in protecting users'
sensitive data, breaches are still an all-too-real worry for consumers and
businesses alike.1 2 9
The widespread problem with millions of people using fingerprint
scanners and other biometric identifiers is that privacy and data security
risks grow as the use ofbiometric identifiers rises in popularity.1 30 As data
breaches have become increasingly common, the security of smartphone
users' private and sensitive information has risen to the forefront of
consumers' minds as they look to keep up with important technological
advancements. 13 'For example, subsequent to Apple's highly-anticipated
iPhone X release, "it took researchers just two weeks to bypass Apple's
Face ID facial recognition using a 3D-printed mask; Face ID can also be

123. Apple, supra note 53.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126.

Storing

Keys

in

the

Secure

Enclave,

APPLE

DEVELOPER,

https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/certificate-keyandtrust_services/keys/storing
keys_inthesecure-enclave (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129.
More

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 637-38; see also Joseph Cox, Are Data BreachesBecoming
Common?,
VICE:
MOTHERBOARD
(July
28,
2016,
12:58 PM),

https://motherboard.vice.com/en-us/article/data-breaches-vigilante-pw (discussing listings of hacks
on Vigilante.pw, which showed that "data breaches have become more frequent over the past few
years.").
130. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 661.
131. Id at 656; see also Cox, supra note 129.
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defeated by individuals related to the authenticated user, including
children or siblings."132
C.

The GeneralData ProtectionRegulation

The EU realized the increasing dangers of biometric data recognition
technology in the twenty-first century and implemented the GDPR in May
2018.133 The GDPR replaced the Data Protection Directive of 1995
("DPD"), becoming "the leading legislation regarding data protection in
the EU." 1 3 4The passing of the DPD was the first time that individuals
received a right to protection of their personal information. 13 5 The broad
and generalized language of the DPD raised the need for increased data
security and provided for a good foundation upon which the GDPR
was created:
Whereas the protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects with
regard to the processing of personal data requires that appropriate
technical and organizational measures be taken, both at the time of the
design of the processing system and at the time of the processing itself,
particularly in order to maintain security and thereby to prevent any
unauthorized processing; whereas it is incumbent on the Member States
to ensure that controllers comply with these measures; whereas these
measures must ensure an appropriate level of security, taking into
account the state of the art and the costs of their implementation in
relation to the risks inherent in the processing and the nature of the data
to be protected. 136

Technological advances, such as advancements in smartphone
capabilities, required revisiting and revising the DPD. 13 7 This led to the
2012 proposal in which the EU sought a "more comprehensive Data
Protection Regulation," indicating that "rapid technological developments
have brought new challenges for the protection of personal data."3 8
One of the factors that makes the GDPR a step in the right direction
is the fact that it "harmonises [sic] data protection law across all member
states, making it identical." 1 3 9 In an effort to increase transparency
132. Rouse, supra note 118.
133. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 376-77.
134. Id. at 376.
135. Id. at 377; see also Council Directive 95/46, Data Protection Directive of 1995, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31, 31 (EC) [hereinafter DPD].
136. DPD, supra note 135, at 35-36.
137. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 377.
138. Id. (quoting Commission Regulation 2016/679,2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2 [hereinafter GDPR]).
139. Thomas McMullan & Joe Curtis, What Is GDPR? Everything You Need to Know, From
Requirements to Fines, ITPRO (Sept. 20, 2018), http://www.itpro.co.uk/it-legislation/27814/what-isgdpr-everything-you-need-to-know.
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between consumers and data-collecting organizations, the GDPR "makes
it easier for people to discover what information organisations [sic] have
on them" as well as what the organizations use the data for.140 A notable
facet of the GDPR, giving it some teeth, is the introduction of larger
penalties for organizations that do not comply with the regulations. 14 1
A key component of the GDPR is the "right to be forgotten." 4 2 As
Thomas McMullan and Joe Curtis explain, the GDPR gives consumers
the power to control their private information:
[P]eople can have their data deleted at any time if it's not relevant
anymore - i.e. the company storing it no longer needs it for the purpose

they collected it for. If the data was collected under the consent model,
a citizen can withdraw this consent whenever they like. They might do
so because they object to how an organisation [sic] is processing their
information, or simply don't want it collected anymore. 143
Under the GDPR, in order for EU citizens to communicate that they
would like their personal data deleted, they must contact the "data
controller," a person or entity that is the principal party that "determines
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data."'" The GDPR
simplifies data protection by essentially creating two categories of
"people" responsible for collecting consumers' data, and then processing
such data.1 45
The two categories created by the GDPR are data controllers and data
processors. 14 6 The GDPR's definition of a data controller is "the natural
or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone
orjointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data."1 4 7 Data processors are defined as a "natural or legal
person, public authority, agency, or other body which processes personal
data on behalf of a data controller."1 48 Data controllers and data processors
work together.1 4 9 However, the controllers bear the burden of proving the
data subjects consented to the processing of their personal data for
specified purposes. 1 5 The GDPR simplifies and unifies data privacy

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 4(7); Monajemi, supra note 59, at 378.
Monajemi, supra note 59, at 378.
See GDPR, supra note 138, at art.1(13).
Id. at art. 4(7).
See id. at art. 4(8); see also Monajemi, supra note 59, at 378.
See GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 4(8).
Id. at art. 7(1).
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security by having one point of contact-the data controller-for people
to "complain and reach out to.""'
Article 7 of the GDPR governs the conditions for consent required
before any subject's personal data can be collected and processed. 15 2 The
consent provision of the GDPR further protects individuals because it
stresses that consent shall not provide a legal basis for the processing of a
person's private data.15 3 The consent clause works synergistically with
Article 32, which further establishes security measures for the actual
processing of a subject's sensitive information.1 54 Article 32 charges data
controllers and data processors with taking measures to protect personal
data against "accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,
unauthorised [sic] disclosure of, or access to personal data transmitted,
stored or otherwise processed.""
The GDPR considers a person's sensitive personal data as a "'special
category of personal data . . .' and by definition require more protection
than [regular] personal data.""' Among the types of personal data
considered to be a special category is biometric data.15 7 As Michael
Monajemi explains in his article, "[o]ne of the most revolutionary aspects
of the GDPR is the fact that it regulates biometric data as a separate entity
rather than trying to include it in an existing privacy scheme that does not
take into account biometric data sensitivity."" The GDPR defines
biometric data as "personal data resulting from specific technical
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural [sic]
characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique
identification of that natural person, such as facial images or
dactyloscopic data.""'
The GDPR realizes that technology is ever-advancing and that
biometric data will continue to evolve; therefore, the GDPR broadly
defines biometric data.160 Monajemi explains that the GDPR is "in a good
position to apply to many different types of biometric data that will arise
through the development of technology." 6 ' The GDPR requires data
controllers to "conduct Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) for many
151. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 379.
152. See GDPR, supranote 138, at art. 7(1).
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. at art. 32(1)-(4).
155. Id. at art. 32(2).
156. Monajemi, supra note 59, at art. 382 (citing GDPR, supra note 138, at art. I(10)).
157. Id. at 382.
158. Id.
159. GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 4(14).
160. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 382-83.
161. Id. at 383.
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forms of biometric data processing." 162 Impact assessments are used when
a type of data processing is likely to result in a "high risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons."163
To protect the rights and freedoms of natural persons, Article 35
addresses three particular instances when controllers would need to run
impact assessments:
A data protection impact assessment . . shall in particular be required
in the case of: (a) a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal
aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated
processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that
produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly
significantly affect the natural person; (b) processing on a large scale of
special categories of data referred to in Article 9(1), or of personal data
relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10; or
(c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a
large scale.1

The rationale behind requiring data controllers to conduct impact
assessments in these particular instances is to determine whether
automated profiling and large-scale processing, if approved, will
adversely affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects. 16 5 In addition,
the GDPR allows data controllers to consult with the data subjects
when appropriate. 166
By enacting the GDPR, the EU recognized the privacy risks to the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the public associated with the
collection and storage of biometric information.167 The GDPR recognizes
that the protection of natural persons "in relation to the processing of
personal data is a fundamental right."1 6' Notably, the GDPR is intended
to "contribute to the accomplishment of an area of freedom, security and
162. Id
163. See GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 35(1) (stating that "[w]here a type of processing in
particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of

the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the
controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged
processing operations on the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of
similar processing operations that present similar high risks.").
164. Id at art. 35(3).
165. Id. at art. 35(7).
166. See id. at art. 35(9) (indicating that "[w]here appropriate, the controller shall seek the views
ofdata subjects or their representatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to the protection
of commercial or public interests or the security of processing operations.").

167. Id.atart.1(51).
168. Id at art. (1) (stating that "Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (the 'Charter') and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) provide that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her.").
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justice and of an economic union, to economic and social progress, to the
strengthening and the convergence of the economies within the internal
market, and to the well-being of natural persons." 16 9 In the United States,
the notion of freedom and security of the "privacies of life" emanates from
the fundamental right to privacy worthy of the protection for which the
Founders fought. 17 0However, there is no existing federal legislation
protecting the public's biometric privacy rights. 17 1 This issue is discussed
in further detail in Part III of this Note.1 7 2
II. THE LACK OF BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
ENDANGERS THE EVER-GROWING AMOUNT OF SMARTPHONE USERS

The United States government, as well as private companies, use
biometric data for different reasons.1 7 3 The use of biometric data to
identify the public, whether for governmental or smartphone-access
purposes, raises legal privacy concerns; namely the lack of federal
regulation on the matter.1 7 4 Subpart A examines the legal issue caused by
the lack of broad federal regulation allowing private companies to remain
unchecked in how they collect, store, and protect sensitive biometric
information.' 7 Subpart B analyzes the leading current state biometric
privacy laws to identify how certain states protect consumers'
biometric privacy.1 76
A. Lack ofBroad FederalRegulation Allows Companies to Use
Customers'InformationLeaving Customers with No Recourse
In 2017, the United States Department of Homeland Security
implemented a program called the Travelers Verification Service
("TVS").1 77 The TVS streamlines the boarding process of international
flights.'7 The key to the TVS is travelers' faces.1 79 Passengers simply
"step up to the gate, get their photo taken and proceed onto the plane.
169. Id. at art. 1(2).
170. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014).
171. Nakar & Greenbaum, supra note 41, at 106.
172.

See infra Part1l.

173. Sales, supra note 27, at 219.
174. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 663 (discussing the current lack of regulation in the United
States to protect consumers).
175. See infra Part III.A.
176. See infra Part Il.B.
177. Catie Edmondson, An Airline Scans YourFace. You Take Off But Few Rules Govern Where
Your Data Goes, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 6,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/us/politics/facial-

recognition-airports-privacy.htm1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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Thanks to facial recognition technology, [a passenger's] face becomes
Similarly, with biometric technology in
their boarding pass.""so
smartphones, the TVS technology is convenient, yet unregulated
and dangerous.'s
One notable issue with the implementation of the TVS is that it
81 2
applies to American citizens as well as other international travelers.
According to reports, few companies participating in the TVS "give
explicit guarantees that passengers' facial recognition data will be
protected." 18 3Additionally, federal officials "have placed no limits on
how participating companies-mostly airlines but also cruise lines-can
use that data or store it, opening up travelers' most personal information
to potential misuse and abuse such as being sold or used to track
passengers' whereabouts."1 84
American travelers are at a significant risk of identity theft through
the use of biometric identification, regardless of whether the information
is obtained through the TVS or through their smartphones:
The data the airlines collect is used to verify the identity of passengers
leaving the country, an attempt by the [D]epartment [of Homeland
Security] to better track foreigners who overstay their visas. After
passengers' faces are scanned at the gate, the scan is sent to Customs
and Border Protection and linked with other personally identifying data,
such as date of birth and passport and flight information. For its part,
Customs and Border Protection has said it will retain facial scans of
American citizens for no longer than 14 days. But the agency has said it
cannot control how the companies use the data. 85
Customs and Border Protection has a duty to protect Americans'
data. 1 8 6 In objecting to the use of facial recognition biometrics, the
American Civil Liberties Union mentioned that "from a privacy
perspective, it is the most dangerous biometric identifier because it has
great potential for expansion and misuse."l8 The implementation of the
180.

Id.

181.

Id.; see also Nolan Rappaport, Will Trump's Biometric Entry-Exit Be as Controversialas

His TravelBan?, THE HILL (Sept. 2, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/404
("Unlike the travel
625-will-trumps-biometric-entry-exit-system-be-as-controversial-as-his-travel
ban, which just applied to aliens seeking admission to the United States, Trump's biometric entryexit tracking system will apply also to American citizens. The facial recognition technology that the
system uses to identify travelers leaving the country will be used to identify American citizens too,
unless they request an alternative means of verifying their identities.").
182. Rappaport, supra note 181.
183. Edmondson, supra note 177.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Rappaport, supra note 181.
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TVS provides further support for the notion that the collection, storage,
and use of biometric identifiers is dangerous for the American public and
has led to a rise in class-action lawsuits in some states. 8 8
While it is reassuring to know that biometric data privacy has made
its way to the judiciary, aside from the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act-which specifically removed biometric identifiers
from protected health information-there is still no federal legislation to
regulate the capture, storage, or use of such sensitive information. 189 For
a country as technologically advanced as the United States, and as a
world-leading country in business, the federal government has failed to
"protect consumers from the collection of biometric data, despite requests
from industry leaders for guidelines to protect individuals from the
collection of their biometric data without their consent." 9 0
Privacy laws do exist, however, and the majority of existing data
privacy laws follow the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") model.' 9 1The OECD, a group of thirty membercountries including the United States, created a model for countries to
follow using the same basic principles:
[(1)] Collection limitationprinciple.Data should be collected by"lawful

and fair means," with the knowledge and consent of the consumer. [(2)]
Dataqualityprinciple.Collected data should be relevant to the purposes
of the data use, and the need for the data should be accurate, complete,
and current. [(3)] Purpose specificationprinciple. Consumers should be

given timely notice of the purpose of the data collection. [(4)] Use
limitationprinciple. The collected data should not be disclosed or made
available to other companies unless there is consent given by the
consumer or authorized by law. [(5)] Security safeguardsprinciple. The

collected data "should be protected by reasonable security safeguards
against such risks as loss or unauthori[z]ed access, destruction, use,
modification or disclosure

of data."

[(6)]

Openness principle.

Companies should make information available to the consumer about
the consumer's collected data. [(7)] Individualparticipationprinciple.

Consumers should be able to challenge incorrect data about them and
should have a right to inquire about the data collection. [(8)]
Accountabilityprinciple. A data controller should be accountable for

188. Dave Zielinski, Use ofBiometric Data Grows, Though Not Without Legal Risks, SOC'Y FOR
HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT.
(Aug.
23, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-

topics/technology/pages/biometric-technologies-grow-.aspx.
189.

Zimmerman, supranote 14, at 645.

190.

Id. at 643-44.

191.

Daveante Jones, Comment, ProtectingBiometricInformation in Arkansas, 69 ARK. L. REV.

117, 129 (2016).
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complying with all the previous principles by having appropriate
safeguards in place, coupled with a notification system.192
The concern, however, is that although some bills have been introduced,
Congress still has not enacted any laws specifically geared towards
93
protecting the privacy of Americans' biometric data.'
94
the Supreme Court established
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
in
order to constitutionally bring
meet
must
a
plaintiff
a three-part test that
a cause of action in court: "(1) there must exist an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is 'concrete and particularized'; (2) the invasion
of that legally protected interest must be 'actual or imminent, not
"conjectural" or "hypothetical"'; and (3) judicial redress must be 'likely'
and not simply 'speculative."' 9 5 A critical requirement of this test is that
a legally protected interestmust exist, thereby establishing the need for a
protective statute. 19 6It follows that the best way for a consumer to seek
recourse for an invasion of data privacy or data breach is to claim a
statutory violation because a statutory violation constitutes an invasion of
a legally protected interest."'
In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
98
to the definition of "wire
added "electronic communications"'
communication" as defined in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act ("OCCSSA")-allowing a plaintiff to recover if an
electronic communication is intercepted or disclosed in violation of the
statute. 1 9 9Title III was intended by Congress to safeguard the privacy of
wire and oral communications. 2 0 0 By enacting the ECPA, Congress
amended Title III and effectively created an umbrella definition of
electronic communication, covering many types of electronic and
2011
In addition to the ECPA, the Stored
internet-based communications.
Communications Act ("SCA") also regulates the storage and use of
electronic-based communications.2 02

192. Id. at 129-30 (citingORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD PRIVACY
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdprivacyframework.pdf.)
(2013),
14-15
FRAMEWORK

(emphasis omitted).
193. Jones, supra note 191, at 130.
194. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
195. Jones, supra note 191, at 126 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
196. Id
197. Id.
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012); see also McKenna, supra note 24, at 1047-49.
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012); see also McKenna, supra note 24, at 1048.
200. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1047.
201. Id. at 1048.
202. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a),(d) (2012) (stating the requirements for a warrant or court order
to obtain access to stored communications); see also McKenna, supra note 24, at 1049.
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While privacy schemes have already been in place, these laws
attempt to protect the privacy of communications by constraining the
reach of the government and by limiting what data private actors may
share with the government. 2 0 3 However, these laws do not protect the
unique characteristics of biometric data from collection and storage by
private actors. 2 0 4The private industry is just as much to blame for putting
consumers' biometric privacy at risk.20 5 As Anne McKenna articulates:
Many people unknowingly supply data when a software app gathers it
surreptitiously, or they supply information through the Internet or their
smartphone for convenience. In the latter case, they do so because their
choice is either give information or be precluded from the use of a
helpful or popular application. Convenience often outweighs thoughts
of privacy, yet when the information given is used for a purpose
different from that of the application for which it was provided, the
consumer has been wronged.20 6
An example, as illustrated by McKenna, is the pairing of "a consumer's
likes and other personal information with face recognition technology,
[thereby allowing] a previously anonymous person [to] be identified and
then targeted with specific marketing" tailored to the individual.2 0 7
Companies that collect and store vast amounts of personal data are
increasingly subject to security breaches.2 08 One example of the
devastating effect of security breaches is the 2014 data breach of the
governmental databases at the United States Office of Personnel
Management. 2 09 As a result of the security breach, more than twenty-two
million people had sensitive information stolen by hackers. 2 10 According
to those U.S. officials close to the matter, "the breach ranks among the

203. See 18 U.S.C. §§2703(c)()-(2) (2012); McKenna, supranote 24, at 1049.
204. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1049.
205. Id. at 1075 (discussing some of the ways that private industry places consumers' personal
data at risk).
206. Id.; see also Nicole Perlroth & Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data Without Permission,
N.Y. TMEs: BITs BLOG (Feb. 15, 2012, 9:05 AM), http:// bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/is/googleand-mobile-apps-take-data-books-withoutpermission?_r=0 (noting that "companies that make many
of the most popular smartphone apps for Apple and Android devices-Twitter, Foursquare and

Instagram among them-routinely gather the information in personal address books on the phone and
in some cases store it on their own computers."). The article further notes that "findings shed more

light on how technology companies sift through people's personal and private information without
their knowledge." Perlroth & Bilton, supra.
207. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1075-76.
208. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 656.
209. Id. at 656-57; see also Tom lacuzio, Accessing Safety in the Age ofBiometrics, EMBRYRIDDLE NEWSROOM (Oct. 11, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://news.erau.edu/headlines/accessing-safety-in-

the-age-of-biometrics.
210. Iacuzio, supra note 209.
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most damaging cyber heists in history primarily due to the detail in the
files, some of which included fingerprints."2 1 1
On September 7, 2017, one of the most damaging data breaches
occurred when consumer-credit-reporting agency Equifax reported a
security breach. 212 The breach took place from mid-May 2017 through
July 2017 and affected 145 million users. 2 13 Although not the largest in
cyber history, the damage caused by the Equifax breach is particularly
2 14
noteworthy due to the sensitive nature of the compromised data.
Hackers accessed "a treasure trove of names, Social Security numbers,
birth dates, street addresses and, in some instances, driver's license
numbers." 2 15 With this type of personal information, "miscreants can pose
as [individuals] to set up credit cards, mortgages, [and] loans" thereby
highlighting the very real horrors of security breaches and the vital need
for uniform data security.2 16
In the case of the Equifax breach, the compromised information was
not necessarily biometric information, however poached biometric
information "poses unique problems for consumers." 2 17 Credit and debit
cards, driver's licenses, Social Security numbers, and passwords can all
be replaced, however, compromised biometric information, by its nature,
cannot be replaced.2 18 As Marc Goodman explains, biometric details that
have been collected and stored "undoubtedly will" become hacked and
"remediation of the problem will prove much more difficult, if
not impossible."2 1 9
Facebook, for example, admitted to collecting, storing, and using the
biometric information of millions and millions of users around the world
through Facebook's facial recognition software. 220 Facebook has become
the world's largest social networking website, 2 2 ' and the sheer volume of
211. Id
212. Elizabeth Palermo& Paul Wagenseil, The Worst Data Breaches ofAll Time, TOM's GUIDE
(Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/pictures-story/872-worst-data-breaches.html#s8
(listing the worst data breaches in cyber history based on the number of affected users as well as the
type of personal data stolen).

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 658.

218.

Id at 658; see also Marc Goodman, You Can't Replace Your Fingerprints,SLATE (Feb. 24,

2015, 10:05 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/02/future-crimes-excerpt-how-hackers-cansteal-fingerprints-and-more.html (discussing the dangers ofbiometric authentication).
219. Goodman, supra note 218.
220. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1068.
221. See Carmen Aguado, Facebookor FaceBank?, 32 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 187, 195, 198
(2012) (discussing Facebook's admitted use of facial recognition technology to collect and store
users' data).
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Facebook users worldwide indicates how much sensitive data is at risk.2 2 2
Aside from hacking into databases, cyber criminals can acquire sensitive
biometric data through their ability to fool biometric technology. 223
Marc Goodman asserts that the future of identity theft involves
stealing and compromising biometrics by discussing the work of Tsutomu
Matsumoto, a security researcher at Yokohama National University:
[Tsutomu Matsumoto] has devised a method allowing him to "take a
photograph of a latent fingerprint (on a wineglass, for example)" and recreate it in molded gelatin. The technique is good enough to fool
biometric scanners 80 percent of the time. Hackers have also used
everyday child's Play-Doh to create fingerprint molds good enough to
fool 90 percent of fingerprint readers. 224
Matsumoto's fingerprint research experiment is only one example
showing how easily biometric authentication can be fooled.22 5
A problem with biometric authentication is "the fact that biometric
information is inherently not a secret." 2 2 6 The dangers do not lie with
fingerprints alone, as the prominence of facial recognition technology has
led to other security risks:
Just as fingerprint sensors can be hacked, so too can face-printing
systems increasingly be used to unlock your phone or computer or to
gain access to your office. All it takes to defeat some systems, such as
those on Lenovo laptops or smartphone password apps such as
FastAccess Anywhere, is to hold up a photograph of the person you wish
to impersonate. This very technique has also worked with iris scanning,
allowing hackers to reverse engineer the biometric information stored in
a secure database and use it to print a photographic iris good enough to
fool most commercial eye scanners. 227
In response to the growing privacy risks associated with biometric
technology, several states have enacted statutes governing biometric data
protection and are attempting to provide recourse tovictims. 2 28

222. McKenna, supra note 24, at 1068; see also Aguado, supranote 221, at 195-96.
223. Goodman, supra note 218.
224. Id.
225. Id. (discussing the problems with hacking facial recognition technology).
226.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 658.

227.
228.

Goodman, supra note 218.
Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 648.
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State Biometric PrivacyLaws

In the absence of broad federal regulation, some states have taken
steps to protect smartphone consumers' biometric data.2 2 9 For example,
states such as Iowa, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and North Carolina "have
recognized the need to regulate the collection of biometric
information." 2 3 0Two states, Illinois and Texas, have taken a step further
by following the OECD model to discern between the intimate nature of
biometric information and regular personal information.2 3 Illinois's
BIPA defines biometric identifier as "a retina or iris scan, fingerprint,
voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry" and does not include
"biological materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy
Act." 2 3 2 The BIPA additionally defines biometric information as "any
information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared,
based on an individual's biometric identifier used to identify
an individual."2 3 3
Illinois's BIPA was the initial state statute governing the privacy of
biometric data. 2 3 4Enacted in 2008, the BIPA was passed "in response to
the growing use of biometrics and the potential for identity theft if
biometric data is compromised." 235 The BIPA contains six key
requirements for any private entity in possession of or collecting
biometric data:
(i) Develop a written policy, available to the public, establishing a
retention schedule and guidelines for destruction;
(ii) Destroy biometric data when the initial purpose for
obtaining/collecting such data has been fulfilled, or within three years
of the person's last interaction with the entity, whichever is sooner;
(iii) Biometric data cannot be collected or otherwise obtained without
prior written consent based on a disclosure to an individual that
biometric data is being collected and the length of time for which the
data is collected;
(iv) Biometric data cannot be sold;
(v) Biometric data cannot be disclosed unless (a) consent is obtained, (b)

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.
Jones, supra note 191, at 132.
Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2010).
Id.

234.

Susan K. Lessack, Using Employees'FingerprintsforTimekeeping: ProtectingEmployee

Data and Minimizing Risk, LEXOLOGY (June 28, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.as
px?g-0d38102e-2032-4fe9-99fe-ba8fab5c2l8 (discussing and comparing the current leading state
biometric privacy laws, specifically Illinois, Texas, and Washington).
235. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5 (2010) (describing the legislative findings and intent for
enacting the Illinois biometric privacy law); Lessack, supra note 234.
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disclosure is necessary to complete a financial transaction requested or
authorized by the subject, (c) disclosure is required by law or (d)
disclosure is required by subpoena; and
(vi) Biometric data must be stored using a reasonable standard of care
for the entity's industry and in a manner that is the same or exceeds the
standards used to protect other confidential information. 236
As the first state to enact a biometric data privacy statute, the Illinois
legislature acknowledged that "[t]he full ramifications of biometric
technology are not fully known." 237
Texas's biometric statute, found in the Texas Business and
Commerce Code, similarly defines biometric identifier as "a retina or iris
scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry." 23 8 The
statute, enacted in 2009, called the "Capture or Use of Biometric
Identifier" ("CUBI"), requires private entities to give notice and obtain an
individual's consent prior to collecting their biometric information. 23 9 The
Texas legislature specified limitations on biometric information that is
captured and possessed for commercial purposes.2 4 0
The CUBI, enacted a year after the BIPA, shares many similarities
with the Illinois statute, however, the CUBI only regulates biometric
identifiers that are used for a "commercial purpose." 24 1 The BIPA contains
no such limitations and therefore has a broader scope.2 4 2 While the BIPA
contains six key requirements, the CUBI states four requirements for
collecting biometric data.24 3 Under the CUBI:
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that
is captured for a commercial purpose:
(1) may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to
another person unless:
(A) the individual consents to the disclosure for identification purposes
in the event of the individual's disappearance or death;
(B) the disclosure completes a financial transaction that the individual
requested or authorized;
(C) the disclosure is required or permitted by a federal statute or by a
state statute other than Chapter 552, Government Code; or
236.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT.

§14/15

(2010); Paul Werner, Six Things You Need to Know Before

CollectingBiometric Information, SHEPPARDMULLIN (June 2,2016), https://www.eyeonprivacy.com

/2016/06/six-things-you-need-to-know-before-collecting-biometric-information

(discussing

the

enactment and impact of current state biometric privacy laws).

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

§ 14/5(f).
TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a) (West 2009).
§ 503.001(a); Lessack, supra note 234.
§ 503.001(b).
Lessack, supra note 234.
Werner, supra note 236.
Id.
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(D) the disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement agency for a law
enforcement purpose in response to a warrant. 244
Both the BIPA and the CUBI have a consent requirement necessary to
collect an individual's biometric information; however, unlike the BIPA,
the CUBI does not require the consent to be in writing.2 4 5
Under both the BIPA and the CUBI, private entities can disclose an
individual's biometric information to a third party 2 4 6 "only if (1) the
individual consents; (2) the disclosure completes a financial transaction
the individual requested or authorized; (3) the disclosure is required by
law; or (4) the disclosure is made in response to a warrant or subpoena." 2 47
The statutory penalties for noncompliance are where the BIPA and the
CUBI largely differ. 2 4 8 The"cost of not complying with the BIPA can be
high," 2 4 9 as the BIPA creates a private right of action for biometric data
privacy violations.2 50
Pursuant to the BIPA, a prevailing party may recover: (1) up to $1000
against a private entity for a violation of BIPA sounding in negligence;
(2) up to $5000 against a private entity that intentionally or recklessly
violates a provision of the BIPA; (3) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,
including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses; and (4) other
relief, including an injunction, as the State or federal court may deem
appropriate. 25 1 The private right of action created in the BIPA sets it apart
from similar laws. 2 5 2 Because the BIPA allows an aggrieved party to
recover liquidated or statutory damages, victims like Lindabeth Rivera
253
and Joseph Weiss have a suitable path to recovery.
The CUBI, on the other hand, does not create a private right of
action. 2 54 instead, the attorney general may bring an action to recover a
civil penalty. 2 5 5A person who violates the CUBI "is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation." 2 56 Regardless of the
method of action, the penalties under the BIPA and the CUBI per violation

244.
245.
246.

§ 503.001(c); Werner, supranote 236.
§ 503.001(b); Lessack, supra note 234.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/15(d)(1)-(4)

247.

Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 649 (citing Jones, supra note 191, at 135-36).

248.
249.
250.

Jones, supra note 191, at 136.
Lessack, supra note 234.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §14/20 (2010); Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 649; Lessack, supra

(2010); §§ 503.001(c)(1)(A-D).

note 234; Werner, supranote 236.

251.
252.

§ 14/20.
Jones, supra note 191, at 136.

253.

Id.; see supra Part I.

254.
255.
256.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001(d).
Id.

§ 503.001(d)
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can easily rise into the millions.2 5 7 Possible recoveries of liquidated
damages ranging from $1000 to $5000 per violation, depending on the
level of intent or recklessness, have made the BIPA a popular tool over
the last year for consumer class action attorneys.25 8 In 2016,
more than a half dozen class action lawsuits have been filed under the
BIPA. Google, Shutterfly and a handful of social media companies have
each been sued over the alleged use of facial geometry recognition
software used for photo tagging. Palm Beach Tan and LA Tan were each
sued over the alleged use of fingerprint data to act as a membership card,
and Smarte Carte was sued over the alleged use of fingerprint security
technology to lock and unlock lockers. Daycare company Cr~me de la
Cr6me was sued recently over the alleged use of fingerprint technology
to ensure the secure pickup of children. 259
Because of the BIPA, many industry-leading tech companies, such as
Google, have been sued for the use of biometric facial recognition
technology, in an effort to "reign[] in the use of' facial
recognitiontechnology.26 0
The BIPA is considered a heavy-hitting statute, as section 15(c)
indicates: "No private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or
biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a
person's or a customer's biometric identifier or biometric information."2 6 1
The BIPA's private right of action under section 20 specifies that: "Any
person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a right of action in
a State circuit court or as a supplemental claim in federal district court
against an offending party." 262 The statutory language allows any person
aggrieved by a violation of the BIPA to bring an action in state or
federal court. 2 63
In 2017, the State of Washington enacted a law governing biometric
privacy. 26 4As the BIPA and the CUBI differ between themselves, the
Washington statute also differs in its statutory definition of biometric
information collection and in regards to civil penalties for biometric

257. Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 651.
258. A. Marcello Antonucci & John P. Morgan, The Future Is in Our Hands: Biometric
Identificationas Authentication, L. PRAC. TODAY (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/

article/the-future-is-in-our-hands-biometric-identification-as-authentication.
259. Werner, supranote 236.
260. See Nakar & Greenbaum, supra note 41, at 91-92 (discussing that many companies, such
as 'Tacebook, Shutterfly, Snapchat, and Google have each been sued over their implementation of

FRT, particularly in Illinois under the BIPA").
261. 740ILL.COMP.STAT.§14/15(c)(2010).
262. § 14/20.
263. Id.
264. Lessack, supra note 234.
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privacy violations. 2 6 5As such, there is a growing need for uniformity as
states are increasingly adopting their own standards concerning the use
and disclosure of biometric information. 2 66 With differing state biometric
privacy laws, companies that collect, store, and/or use biometric
information will need a clear and uniform set of guidelines to follow when
implementing biometric identification programs.26 7
Most recently, on June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown
signed a bill into law, effectively creating the California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2018 ("CCPA").2 6 8 The CCPA became "the strictest
consumer data protection law in the country." 26 9 The CCPA is relevant
and appropriate, as it employs parts of the European GDPR:
[T]he CCPA gives consumers access to their data, the right to have their
personal data deleted and the ability to opt out of having their data sold.
The CCPA also goes further than any existing law in the United States.
At the federal and state level, the U.S. has various data protection and
privacy laws focused on specific financial, health and student
information. However, these laws largely leave the bulk of the data
economy--everything from data brokers to social mediabeyond reproach.27 0
The CCPA has statutory damages set at "$100 to $750 per person, per
breach, or actual damages, whichever is greater ... damages are higher
for a civil suit brought by the attorney general."2 7 1 The CCPA is a large
step in bringing accountability to the data economy.2 7 2
IV.

FEDERAL BIOMETRiC DATA AGENCY: REGULATING THE

COLLECTION, STORAGE, AND USE OF SMARTPHONE
USERS' SENSITIVE DATA

A solution to the legal issue explained above is twofold: first, a
proposed broad federal legislation that regulates-similarly to the BIPA,
265. Id
266. Antonucci & Morgan, supra note 258.
2 6 7. Id.
268. Jason Tashea, Calfornia'sNew Data Privacy Laws Could Change How Companies Do
Business in the Golden State, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1. 2019,1:50 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/magaz
ine/article/gdpr california dataprivacylaw.
269. Id.
270. Id ("In contrast to the GDPR, the CCPA does not give consumers complete ownership of
their data; nor does it create data minimization standards, which require companies to only use as

much user data as needed to complete a task. But the new law creates leverage for consumers through
a private right of action, allowing individuals to sue a company if their personal information is
released as a result of a data breach.").
271. Id
272. Id
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the CUBI, the CCPA, and the GDPR-the collection, storage, and use of
smartphone users' sensitive biometric data; and second, the creation of the
Federal Biometric Data Agency ("FBDA") tasked with the enforcement
of the proposed biometric legislation. 2 7 3 Having discussed the most
progressive biometric data privacy legislation to date among the states and
the EU, this Note proposes a preventative and uniform approach to the
legal problem of biometric data privacy regulation. 2 74 Below, Subpart A
gives an overview of notable United States legislative responses to certain
historical crises.2 7 5Subpart B extends the federal agency creation concept
by proposing the application of the said concept to the creation of the
FBDA. 2 7 6Subpart B further proposes the application of parts of leading
biometric data privacy laws to create a uniform federal biometric data
privacy law in the United States.2 77
A.

CreatingFederalAgencies in Response to Crises

In October 1929, when the stock market crashed, Congress held
hearings to identify problems and solutions to the lack of public
confidence in U.S. markets. 2 78 The congressional intervention during the
peak of the Great Depression resulted in the passage of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA"), which created
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").2 7 9 The Securities Act
of 1933 and the SEA were designed to restore investor confidence in the
stock market:

-

[B]y providing investors and the markets with more reliable information
and clear rules of honest dealing. The main purposes of these laws can
be reduced to two common-sense notions: [(1)] Companies publicly
offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public the truth
about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the risks
involved in investing. [(2)] People who sell and trade securities
brokers, dealers, and exchanges - must treat investors fairly and
honestly, putting investors' interests first. Monitoring the securities
industry requires a highly coordinated effort. Congress established the
273. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 644, 664 (noting that there is no uniform federal law
regulating the collection, storage, use, and trading ofbiometric information, and that "[p]rotection for
consumers' biometric information will only be as strong as the laws or regulations that are put in
place to govern the private industry's collection and storage ofthis sensitive information.").

274.
275.
276.
277.

See supra Part .C; infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.B.

278.

The

Role

of

the

SEC,

INVESTOR,

https://www.investor.gov/introduction-

investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
279. Id.
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Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934 to enforce the newlypassed securities laws, to promote stability in the markets and, most
28 0
importantly, to protect investors.

The SEC's mission is "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."281
More recently, in response to the financial crisis of2008, the Obama
Administration enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter "Dodd-Frank Act") in 2010.282
Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act created a federal agency, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"). 2 8 3 The CFPB is a regulatory
284
One
agency that oversees financial products and services to consumers.
federal
the
as
costly,
is
agencies
federal
creating
that
argue
could
government is currently operating at a deficit; however, as growing
pressures rise, the cost to individuals whose biometric information is
82 5
compromised can be just as steep of a price.
B.

ProposedResponse to the Biometric DataPrivacy Crisis

Similar to the advent of the SEC and the CFPB, in response to
growing technology affecting the personal data of millions of individuals,

280.

What WeDo, U.S. SEC. &EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwe

do.html (last modified June 10, 2013) [hereinafter SEC].
28 1. Id.
282. Will Kenton, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
INVESTOPEDIA,https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dodd-frank-fmancial-regulatory-reform-

bill.asp (last updated May 10, 2019) (noting that one of the ways the Dodd-Frank Act heavily
regulates the United States financial system is by "monitoring the financial stability ofmajor financial
firms whose failure could have a serious negative impact on the U.S. economy (companies deemed
'too big to fail').").
283. Id.
284. Id. The CFPB helps consumer finance markets work more efficiently by providing and
enforcing rules:
The [CFPB], established under Dodd-Frank, was given the job of preventing predatory
mortgage lending (reflecting the widespread sentiment that the subprime mortgage market
was the underlying cause of the 2008 catastrophe) and make it easier for consumers to
understand the terms of a mortgage before agreeing to them. It deters mortgage brokers
from earning higher commissions for closing loans with higher fees and/or higher interest
rates and requires that mortgage originators not steer potential borrowers to the loan that
will result in the highest payment for the originator. The [Dodd-Frank Act] was intended
to prevent another financial crisis like the one in 2008.
Id
285. Palermo& Wagenseil, supra note 212; Matheson Russell, How Much Does the Government
Cost?, MAROTTA WEALTH MGMT. (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.marottaonmoney.com/how-much-

does-the-government-cost (describing the amount of money that Congress allowed the federal
government to spend in 2013, using data from the Office of Management and Budget. The data lists
twenty-nine federal agencies and "Undistributed Offsetting Receipts" and how much money each
requires from the national budget).
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the EU responded by enacting the GDPR.2 8 6In light of the biometric data
privacy crisis throughout the EU, the GDPR offers a "strong and more
coherent data protection framework in the Union, backed by strong
enforcement." 2 8 7The GDPR works well in the EU, in part, because of the
increased penalties associated with non-compliance. 2 8 8 Fines can be heavy
for companies that fail to follow certain GDPR regulations, as the GDPR
allows for supervisory authorities:
Supervisor authorities have investigative powers and can issue warnings
for non-compliance, perform audits, and need companies to meet
deadlines. The supervising authorities watch the data controllers and
processors to make sure that they met the demands of the GDPR. If a
supervising authority finds that an organization has been in violation,
then they have the power to put sanctions on companies that have failed
to follow with the Regulation. Instead ofbeing fined a specific number,
the GDPR will base sanctions on the affected company's revenue. If
companies do not follow with certain GDPR regulations, then the fines
that are imposed may be up to 4% of the annual income for
a corporation. 289
Consequentially, and due to the extraterritorial reach of the GDPR,
American companies who wish to do business in the EU must be aware
of GDPR regulations if they wish to remain compliant.2 9 0
As the GDPR was enacted to provide uniform biometric data
protection across the EU, it is imperative that the United States follow suit
to protect biometric data with a uniform regulatory scheme. 2 91 Already,
the "Internet Association and other industry leaders prefer a federal law
to a patchwork of state rules." 29 2 This can be accomplished through federal
legislation modeled after the leading privacy regulations discussed in this
Note such as the GDPR, the BIPA, the CUBI, and the CCPA.2 9 3
Just as the GDPR allows for supervisory authorities with
investigative powers to audit and ensure compliance, the FBDA would
have similar authority to the supervisory authorities in the EU, much like
the SEC and CFPB's authority over financial matters here in the United
286. See supra PartI.C.
287. See GDPR, supranote 138, at art. 1(7).
288. Id. at art. 58(2)(a)-(j); see also Monajemi, supra note 59, at 393.
289. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 393. See generally GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 58 (listing
the investigative, corrective, authorization, and advisory powers of the supervisory authorities,
including the power to issue opinions and draft codes, and order the erasure and recertification of
personal data).
290. Monajemi, supra note 59, at 390.
291. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 644.
292. Tashea, supra note 268.
293. See supra Parts I.C, IB.
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States. 29 4A notable difference between the FBDA and the GDPR is that
the FBDA would have sole authority to regulate, audit, and ensure
biometric data privacy compliance, as opposed to multiple supervisory
authorities. 2 9 5As previously discussed, existing privacy laws in states like
Illinois, Texas, and California have already made an impact on biometric
privacy rights.2 96
The proposed federal biometric data privacy scheme would highlight
effective language from the current models, for example, the BIPA and
the CCPA create a private right of action for victims of biometric data
privacy violations. 2 9 7 Following the BIPA's threat of liquidated and
statutory damages of up to $5000 per violation, and civil penalties of up
to $25,000 under CUBI, a federal penalty of up to $10,000 per violation,
applied on a national level, would place companies under the threat of
heavy uniform penalties, thereby incentivizing compliance with federal
biometric data privacy law.2 9 8
Federal biometric data privacy legislation modeled after current state
laws would center around biometric identifiers, including retina and iris
29 9
scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, hand geometry, and face geometry.
Furthermore, the federal legislation needs a broad application, not one that
is limited to biometric information solely used for commercial purposes
such as the Texas CUBLI.3 00 A critical component of federal biometric data
privacy laws is the requirement of informed consent prior to any
01
disclosure of an individual's biometric information.3 Lastly, like the
BIPA, the CUBI, the CCPA, and the GDPR, the proposed federal
legislation would require companies to permanently destroy biometric
information either: (1) at the request of the individual; (2) once the
individual terminates interaction with the company; or (3) within a
30 2
reasonable period of time after the information was initially collected.
Much like with other federal agencies, such as the SEC, crucial to
the effectiveness of federal biometric data privacy law is its
enforcement. 3 0 3Each year "the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforcement
actions against individuals and companies for violation of the securities
294. See GDPR, supra note 138, at art. 58.
295. Id. at art. 1(79).
296.

See Zimmerman, supranote 14, at 648.

297.

See supra notes 250-72 and accompanying text; see also Tashea, supra note 268.
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Werner, supra note 236.

299.

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

300.

Werner, supra note 236.

§ 14/10 (2010).

301. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 14/15(d)(1) (2010).
302. § 14/15(a); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(3) (West 2009).
303. See What We Do, supra note 280 (explaining the enforcement responsibilities and civil
actions brought by the SEC against individuals and companies for violations of securities laws).
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laws." 3 The federal biometric data privacy legislation would create the
FBDA and its responsibilities-such as the interpretation and
enforcement of federal biometric data privacy laws-would parallel the
SEC's responsibilities of interpreting and enforcing federal
securities laws.30 s
Ultimately, the FBDA operating similarly to the SEC, would ensure:
(1) the creation of new rules and the amending of existing rules; (2)
inspection of companies' biometric information programs; (3) that
companies cannot profit from individuals' biometric information; and (4)
coordination of U.S. biometric data regulation with federal, state, and
foreign authorities. 3 0 6The FBDA's enforcement power paired with a
national biometric privacy framework that preempts state laws and
provides recourse for aggrieved individuals, much like the BIPA's
liquidated and statutory damages clause and the CCPA's damages clause,
would force companies to act in the interest of the individuals. 307 This
Note ultimately proposes a federal biometric data protection law that, at
its very core, like the CCPA and the GDPR, gives "consumers access to
their data, the right to have their personal data deleted and the ability to
opt out of having their data sold."3 0 8
V.

CONCLUSION

It is certainly awe-inspiring to look back to times as recent as the last
turn of the century and admire how far technology has come.3 0 9 Inturn,it
has become difficult to imagine a world without smartphones, and
subsequently, a world without the problems caused by such advanced
technology.310
There is undoubtedly a need for broad federal legislation and for the
proposition of model legislation."' As stated above, the proposed creation
of the FBDA and uniform federal legislation modeled after the GDPR, the
BIPA, the CUBI, and the CCPA would ensure that everyday people like
Lindabeth Rivera and Joseph Weiss have the necessary recourse, should
their biometric information become compromised.3 1 2

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 251-72 and accompanying text.
Tashea, supra note 268.

309.

See supra Part II.

310. See supra Parts l-IV.
311. See supra Parts m-IV.
312.

See supra Part I.
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The enactment of the GDPR in the EU has increasingly put pressure
3 13
History
on the United States to keep up with data privacy initiatives.
has shown that Congress has resorted to creating agencies, and while it
may be costly, Congress did it in 2010.314 Broad federal legislation and
the creation of the FBDA will keep the United States up to date with
advancements in biometric technology, and it will lead the country in the
right direction by protecting the biometric information of its citizens
through pressuring companies to reassess their data protection operations
315
and comply with federal law.
JP Raynal*

313. Tashea, supra note 268 (quoting California Democratic Assemblyman and co-author of the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Ed Chau: "Europe is already ahead of us, as we've seen
with GDPR").
314. See supra Part IV.A.
315. See supra Parts II-IV.
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